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One who keeps herself up-to-date on recent epistemological 
trends may find at least two distinct camps currently at odds on the 
nature of knowledge. On the one hand, we find a group of 
epistemological iconoclasts who seem to favor significant conceptual 
change with regard to the concept 'knowledge/ and a group of 
traditionalists. I take the epistemological iconoclasts to be largely 
those reacting against the 'justified true belief (hereafter JTB) 
account of knowledge on the grounds that if it captures any of what 
should be called knowledge, it only captures a small subset, namely 
'knowledge that' or prepositional knowledge, while neglecting skill 
knowledge and other nonpropositional cognitive achievements. I take 
the traditionalist camp to be comprised largely of those defending 
JTB (and hence, propositional) accounts of knowledge. In addition, 
some traditionalists try to accommodate their JTB accounts against 
threats that we may be 'Gettierized;' thus, such individuals take 
knowledge to be justified, true belief plus another condition to ward 
off allowing Gettier cases to count as instances of knowledge. These 
two camps appear largely antithetical to each other, at least at first 
glance. But both seem to hold that knowledge is a universal norm 
that is recommended for human pursuit and that provides a standard 
against which actual human cognitive achievements are evaluated. 
Where they differ is most apparent in the areas of how determining 
the universal norm or standard should be conceived and how well 
human cognitive achievements 'measure up' against this standard. 
Traditional epistemologists tend first to establish the criteria for 
knowledge, and following that, to evaluate human achievements 
against their standard. Some recent epistemologists guide their 
choice of criteria by first selecting some of our highest cognitive 
achievements, or apparent paradigm instances of knowledge, and 
then deriving a conception or theory based on paradigm instances of 
how we use the term 'knowledge.' Thus, presently I want to alternate 
between viewing how we ordinarily use the word 'knowledge' and 
how I think we ought to use the word 'knowledge. ' From this 
alternation I wish to carve a rough conception of knowledge by 
exploring several questions. But note, to begin, that my overall 
motivation is to operate according to a principle of preservation; I 
want to preserve as much of the traditional (JTB) account of 
knowledge as possible, while regarding cognitive endeavors that may 
not properly called 'knowledge' as equally intellectually and 
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pragmatically valuable. Some would argue that our use of the term 
'knowledge' should expand to become applicable to various 
nonpropositional cognitive achievements, e.g., skills. Thus, I first 
want to attempt to clarify what we mean by knowledge embodied in 
skills. In clarifying, I will ask whether we ought to apply the term 
'knowledge' to the cognitive efficacy embodied in skills and if so, 
whether such an application serves to undermine the conception of 
knowledge as justified true belief. 
Second, I will discuss the following question. If we conceive of 
knowledge roughly as justified true belief, and since scientific beliefs 
often turn out to be false, then is science not the knowledge generator 
we think it is? But since we take science to be the area in which our 
greatest cognitive achievements occur, claiming that science does not 
produce the vast body of knowledge we think it does calls into 
question a paradigm instance of knowledge. Thus, I will address 
whether we should adjust our concept of knowledge to accommodate 
science as a paradigm instance, or preserve the traditional concept of 
knowledge and reject the notion that science presents a paradigm 
instance of knowledge. 
In answering my first and second questions, I will defend the 
JTB account of knowledge, although my doing so will be rife with 
qualifications and compromises. My third aim is to sketch an account 
of justification I find most appropriate if one is to preserve the JTB 
definition of knowledge, namely, one that allows the criteria for 
being justified to vary according to the individual's context and 
goals, thereby possibly making justification and knowledge more 
accessible than other JTB.accounts. Finally, I will conclude that we 
ought to preserve the concept of knowledge as roughly that of 
justified true belief, but that our set of cognitive values and ideals 
must expand to include more than just knowledge. Rather than 
change our concept of knowledge, perhaps we ought simply to allow 
other intellectual endeavors to share the cognitive limelight; that 
way, we can avoid undergoing a bewildering conceptual change and 
yet also avoid shortchanging more recent cognitive achievements 
that receive growing attention. In addressing the above concerns, I 
will begin by discussing the most recent proposed inclusion to 
knowledge, namely, 'knowledge how' or knowledge embodied in 
skills. 
I. Skill Knowledge: What it is and What it Means for JTB 
Theories 
Epistemologists concern themselves with skill knowledge both 
as a result of the work of Michael Polanyi (1958, 1967) and perhaps 
as a result of political issues aiming to address whether 'knowledge 
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how' has been excluded from what has traditionally been called 
knowledge because of its association with the working class, manual 
laborers and craftsmen. Some might actually find skill knowledge 
more basic than propositional knowledge. While there may be good 
reasons for taking skill knowledge to be more basic, one first needs 
to clarify the notion of a skill and how it embodies knowledge. Since 
I do not know of any necessary and sufficient conditions for defining 
a skill, and since we refer to a skill as 'knowledge how', we might 
first look at how we use the phrase 'knowing how'. We say of young 
children that they know how to feed themselves, tie their shoes, tell 
time, and so on, while we say of teenagers and adults that they know 
how to play the piano, drive, ride a bicycle, swim, sew, fix a car, 
knit, and so on. These activities may have little in common other 
than that they are all learned at some point, and that they are learned 
in stages. Learning in stages seems central to a skill to differentiate it 
from activities that one tries and either can or cannot do from the First 
try, for example, curling one's tongue or contorting one's limbs in a 
'doublejointed' position; we typically say that one can curl her 
tongue but not that she knows how to curl her tongue since such an 
ability is genetic. In addition, Brown (1992) claims that skills are 
learned by training and practice, improve with practice, deteriorate 
when not exercised, and are exercised fallibly even among those with 
great expertise. However, and as is to be expected, one also Finds 
scores of borderline cases, activities that one learns but learns 
quickly, such as skipping or snapping one's fingers. Are such 
activities skills? 1 am inclined to deny that they are because it seems 
that once one 'catches on', there is no more to learn. More likely, we 
will call those activities skills which not all adults can do, are 
typically learned in stages, show some kind of proficiency or 
expertise and reveal some sort of technique as they are being carried 
out. 
The problem with defining a skill en route to deciding whether 
there is such a thing as nonpropositional skill knowledge is that we 
can, ad hoc of course, call all and only those things skills that either 
are or are not conceivable in propositional stages. Then, if I call only 
those activities 'skills' which I can reduce to propositional stages, I 
can assert that skill knowledge really is 'knowledge that' in clever 
disguise and still maintain that whatever is nonpropositional is 
neither a skill nor properly called knowledge. Our intuitions seem to 
be of little help since they are likely to be guided by our theories, so 
we may expect disagreement on which activities to call skills and 
embodiments of knowledge. Also, we want to decide whether such 
activities count as instances of knowledge to judge whether they are 
nonpropositional and whether the JTB account of knowledge will be 
rendered irrelevant if it cannot apply to such activities. 
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We can, of course, make headway even without a clear 
conception of what a skill is, as long as we use examples with the 
awareness that we are presupposing a notion of skill that is open to 
objections. Also, with regard to the question of whether the 
knowledge embodied in skills is propositional, in examining 
performed skills in which the individual cannot give a propositional 
account of what she is doing, we must consider reasons why she 
cannot give a propositional account of what she is doing other than 
the reason that no such account can be given. Recall that Harman 
(1994) presents an unusual view of foundationalism in which one is 
only justified so long as she can keep track of the justificatory chain 
supporting her belief. According to such a version of 
foundationalism, if I cannot reproduce the steps in Goedel's proof I 
am no longer justified in believing the conclusion, even though I 
could reproduce it if I had adequate time to check my logic book and 
'refresh my memory' as to how I learned it in the first place. A more 
natural response might be to assume that I am still justified in 
believing the Goedel proof since I remember in a more general sense 
how I came to believe it although I have since forgotten the specific 
steps by which the conclusion is obtained. Propositional steps were 
an indispensable part of the learning process, although I cannot now 
tell someone in a satisfactory way how I learned the proof. 
A similar process to the learning of a proof might take place with 
many skills. A series of propositions are learned to acquire the skill, 
but once the skill can be successfully performed, the propositions 
gradually fall out of memory. But note, I am not suggesting that 
learning a series of propositions is sufficient for learning a skill, nor 
that learning a skill is algorithmic. I am merely postulating that 
learning a series of propositions may be necessary for learning a 
skill, and that the successful performance of the skill may be similar 
to the conclusion of the proof; once the end result is reached, the 
steps are forgotten until one is called upon to reproduce them. Again, 
I am trying to offer suggestion's as to why 'knowledge how' cannot 
be explained propositionally (by the one performing the skill) in 
many cases without asserting that this must be (or must not be) the 
case. Rather, I want to propose possible explanations for why the 
JTB account of knowledge (and hence propositional knowledge) may 
still be involved in 'knowing how.' 
Consider swimming as an example of a skill . 1 Talented 
competitive swimmers usually learn how to swim at an early age. (Of 
1 Again, my selection of a particular activity as a skill is tentative. If one disagrees 
that swimming is a skill, one will probably also disagree with the conclusions I draw 
about skill knowledge from the example of swimming. Thus, my minimal hope is 
that if one agrees that swimming is a skill, she will agree with my conclusions drawn 
from the example. 
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course, we may repeat an analogous statement for talented athletes 
and musicians in general.) Such talented swimmers probably do not 
remember much about what it was like when they learned how to 
swim, and they may not be very good at teaching others how to 
swim. On the other hand, they may be very good at teaching other 
talented swimmers how to improve their technique. Perhaps the more 
talented swimmer can frequently explain to the fellow talented 
swimmer how to improve her technique because it is less difficult to 
think of explanations in terms each would understand, which may not 
be the case with the beginning swimmer. Explaining the acquisition 
of a skill to one who attempts to leam it for the first time may require 
the expert to refrain from employing skill jargon and instead employ 
simpler terms in the explanation, which may tax her memory. She 
may experience a tax on her memory simply because she is not 
frequently called upon to offer such 'layperson' explanations. 
Similarly, graduate students in philosophy who converse solely 
with fellow graduate students may have difficulty explaining 
philosophical notions to introductory students without employing 
philosophical jargon which the student does not yet understand. 
Graduate students may have even greater difficulty doing so than 
professors, because graduate students simply may not yet be 
accustomed to offering such explanations and (employing different 
terms) to those of varying degrees of philosophical background and 
competence, while professors, though much more philosophically 
advanced than graduate students, have had more practice at giving 
such explanations. In short, one reason those with skill knowledge 
may not be able to explain how they perform their skills may.be a 
simple communication barrier; they may be able to explain much of 
what they do to someone slightly less knowledgeable (but still versed 
in the jargon of the skill), but not to someone who does not even 
understand many of the concepts required for a simple explanation. 
The second reason one may not be able to explain the acquisition 
or performance of her skill is that she cannot remember what it was 
like to learn the skill at that level. We see examples of this problem 
in attempts to explain how to write well to a student whose paper has 
an abominable number of simple grammatical errors. I may 
remember how I learned to improve my writing style in various 
stages in college, but not in grammar school. Such a stage in my 
learning process has long been forgotten. Thus, I do not remember 
how I learned to avoid making the type of errors made by the student 
I am required to help, but if I visited my former grammar teachers I 
probably could get a general idea of how I corrected my grammatical 
misconceptions and progressed at that level and then be of greater 
help to the struggling student. I may have had to learn a series of 
propositions to progress to the point I am at today, but the 
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propositions that I was required to know to learn that skill are no 
longer part of my working memory. In some cases, (with swimming 
for example), at each stage of skill acquisition or improvement I 
learn new propositions which may assume knowledge of an earlier 
stage. But what I remember about the earlier stage will be only 
enough to preserve my existing knowledge; I will not remember all 
that was taught to me in order to explain how to do something "from 
scratch" at an earlier stage. 
The main point I want to make from the above discussion is that 
we have to be wary of hastily concluding that (at least partially) 
propositional accounts cannot be given of skills just because when 
we ask those engaged in the skills they cannot immediately offer a 
propositional account of what they are doing. It seems that 
propositions are involved in the skill even if propositions cannot 
provide an exhaustive account of what is going on. Evidence for the 
notion that propositions are at work in performing skills may be 
found when we watch someone practice her skill and learn how to 
improve. Practice sessions often involve breaking down the skill into 
various steps and analyzing those steps so that one learns how to 
perform the skill more efficiently. Improving one's technique at a 
skill such as swimming, for example, is highly dependent on 
propositional knowledge. Factual knowledge, such as an 
understanding that the greater water resistance one causes, the more 
slowly she will move, enables one to strive for an aquadynamic 
technique. Swimmers are taught how to move their hands in an ~ 
shape while pulling to move the greatest amount of "still water" and 
achieve the maximum efficiency out of each stroke. In short, if the 
goal is to move as quickly as possible though the water, a talented 
swimmer usually holds many justified, true beliefs about why 
moving her arms and legs in a particular way will expend the least 
amount of energy and have the most efficient stroke technique, 
thereby achieving her goal. 
Also, some activities may involve repetitive motor skills that are 
mere physical habits that can occur apart from any particular 
cognitive state, just as one may drum her Fingers or jiggle her foot 
without even realizing she is doing so. It is not as though such 
activities involve nonpropositional knowledge; rather, some appear 
to be almost noncognitive. But even in repetitive skills, one 
apparently has a belief that she ought to carry out the particular task 
in the same way she did previously, because the way in which she 
carried out the task previously enabled her to achieve her goal. In 
short, if we think of carrying out a skill as intentional action, then we 
will assume that it involves beliefs and desires of some sort. 
Presumably, one has at least a belief about what she is doing that 
helps to explain the repetitiveness, namely, that the way in which she 
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carried out the task before enabled her to achieve her goal and 
carrying out the task the same way in the future will continue to 
enable her to achieve her goal. For if one holds no beliefs about 
whether she is carrying out a task appropriately, the action seems 
unintentional, and certainly not properly embodying knowledge, but 
merely an accidental maneuvering, or with some skills, beginner's 
luck. 
The JTB theorist may also allege that if one performing a skill 
holds no beliefs about what she is doing while she is doing it, it is 
unclear how knowledge is embodied in the activity. For knowledge 
presumably cannot apply to motor activity; it typically applies to 
cognitions. But one's cognitions either are or are not about one's 
motor activity during the performance of the skill. If they are not at 
all, then the JTB theorist may fail to see how knowledge is in any 
way embodied in what takes place while that skill is being carried 
out If they are, then it seems that propositional knowledge is bound 
to come back into the central picture. 
I am not trying to suggest that skill knowledge can be entirely 
grasped in propositional language or is even convertible into 
propositional language. Let us consider another example. Gymnasts 
often report having a 'feel' during a routine or a dismount in which 
they are still in the air but claim to know how they are going to land 
based on how they "took off." They may very well know how they 
will land, or be very accurate predictors of their landings while they 
are still in the air. How do we account for this 'feel' that seems a part 
of their skill knowledge? I doubt that gymnasts possess a body of 
propositions that they recite to themselves at this point; rather, it 
seems as if they take a kind of mental picture or snapshot of how 
they felt overall once before while successfully dismounting and 
remember it as an instance of what the achievement of the goal felt 
like. They may not remember exactly what they did in the process of 
the last successful dismount but may recall by trial and error that a 
particular feeling during the "take-off is familiar as an instance of 
success or failure. Beliefs that one's mental picture of the event 
match a previous successful dismount can still be true or false; one 
can, of course, think she will have a successful dismount based on 
her belief that her overall feeling matches a feeling she had when she 
successfully dismounted, but still be wrong. Also, such mental 
pictures of what the right dismount felt like may be combined with 
some simple "physics" beliefs that also allow her to predict her 
landing. But her beliefs and desires about what she is doing while she 
is doing it are what differentiate her from the individual who simply 
dismounts successfully by accident, never having performed a 
dismount before and never having thought about how it should work. 
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I wish to draw several points from the preceding discussion of 
skill knowledge. First, we may conceive of a skill roughly as an 
activity which is not typically performed by all adults, is learned and 
improved in stages, and is performed with varying degrees of 
expertise and with varying techniques. Second, there is a valuable 
cognitive achievement involved in the acquisition, performance, and 
perfection of a skill. One exercising a skill has a recognized goal 
which can be achieved more or less successfully, and we may 
evaluate her efficacy and expertise accordingly. Presumably, such an 
evaluation also requires a norm or standard against which skill 
performance is measured. Third, one's success at exercising a skill is 
usually manifested by a complex combination of physical dexterity 
or agility and cognitions including, (but not exhausted by), beliefs 
and desires. Furthermore, I take the beliefs and desires involved in 
the successful exercising of a skill generally to be true and justified. 
What does this mean for the JTB definition of knowledge? It does 
not seem that JTB accounts of knowledge are undermined simply by 
showing that what we call skill knowledge is not wholly 
proposi t ional . Because skill knowledge is not wholly 
nonpropositional, JTB accounts still seem relevant to explaining the 
nature of skill knowledge. The challenge I see facing JTB accounts 
of knowledge with regard to skill knowledge is not whether an 
exhaustive explanation can be given in propositional language, but 
whether sufficient sense can be made of skill knowledge in 
propositional language. 
Also, because I know of no alternative conceptions of knowledge 
that account more adequately for skill knowledge and possess the 
overall explanatory power that JTB accounts have, at this point I 
favor preserving JTB accounts of knowledge and attempting to 
translate the murky processes at work in skill performance into 
propositional language where possible. Furthermore, although I hold 
that JTB accounts of knowledge should explain the exercising of 
skills where possible, it does not follow that 1 maintain that what we 
commonly refer to as 'skill knowledge' ought properly to be called 
knowledge, for it need not, and perhaps should not. Thus, two 
possible implications for JTB accounts are that (1) JTB theorists may 
claim that they provide an adequate account of skill knowledge 
insofar as what is embodied in skills is properly called knowledge, 
but also that (2) they need not say that most of what is embodied in 
skills is properly called knowledge. Rather, they may say that 
whatever cognitive efficacy or achievement is embodied in skills is 
equally as valuable as knowledge, but for the sake of conceptual 
simplicity, should not actually be called knowledge. Again, we may 
value the successful or expert exercising of a skill as highly as 
knowledge without actually including it under the rubric of 
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knowledge. But it is my contention that we ought to be more 
concerned with having the right overall cognitive values and ideals 
than with valuing only knowledge and then including as much as we 
possibly can within the concept of knowledge. In sum, the existence 
of nonpropositional skill expertise does not warrant our rejection of 
the JTB definition of knowledge. 
II. The Problem of Scientific Knowledge 
Another statement used to level a challenge against JTB accounts 
of knowledge is that we take ourselves to be in possession of a vast 
body of scientific knowledge. And yet, if knowledge is defined as 
justified, true belief, and given that most of our scientific beliefs turn 
out to be false, we do not in fact have the vast body of scientific 
knowledge that we think. So we either have to admit that our 
paradigm case of knowledge turns out not to be knowledge after all, 
or throw out the truth requirement for knowledge, thereby altering 
our concept to fit our paradigm case of knowledge. I take the former 
to be the more desirable alternative. 
Relinquishing the truth requirement is a bit frightening primarily 
because we do not know whether another criterion will have to 
replace truth as necessary for knowledge, or whether something like 
mere justified belief will suffice. Because I know of no replacements 
for truth as a necessary criterion, I will only discuss the latter 
alternative. Suppose we define knowledge as mere justified belief. 
Presumably, we can still retain the notion that once one becomes 
aware that her belief is false, she is no longer justified in holding it. 
At least given this, truth is not entirely out of the picture because 
awareness of falsity undermines one's justification. If we do not 
require truth for knowledge, one who has a justified belief can 
already claim to possess knowledge, and since knowledge is our 
highest epistemic ideal, then should the individual find her belief is 
true, 2 nothing much is added to her epistemic situation. Perhaps the 
individual would have knowledge in a stronger sense, but no 
epistemic threshold would be crossed. Also, relinquishing truth as a 
necessary criterion for knowledge seems as though it could harm the 
practice of science, for if two scientific practitioners held justified 
beliefs which contradicted each other, one could assert that they both 
know, even though one claims to know A and the other claims to 
know - A . But then why would further scientific investigation be 
needed? Typically, if two individuals claim to know propositions 
which contradict one another, we assume that they cannot both 
know, and yet, if knowledge does not require truth, they can both 
2 I am speaking hypothctically here; I realize that one might charge that we never 
conclusively find out a belief is true. 
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know, which leaves us lo wonder why further hypothesis-testing 
would be needed. 
But what alternative do we have? Must we claim that scientists 
do not possess the knowledge we think they do? The answer is both 
yes and no. If we answer yes, again, such an answer need not demean 
scientific achievements in any way, for although knowledge is highly 
valued, we do not merely value the truth of the 'end state' concluding 
belief. We also value the methods and reasoning processes that give 
rise to the conclusion and the justification for that belief. If the 
processes giving rise to the conclusion are useful and frequently 
produce beliefs that seem likely to be true, we have little reason to 
despair. We respect scientific practice because it employs methods, 
reasoning, and testing procedures that seem to make arriving at truth 
(and knowledge) likely. But, one might object, if scientists in fact 
turn out to be wrong so much of the time, why should we think that 
these methods are in fact valuable and likely to produce knowledge? 
We should continue to value the methods because they are what 
tell us we were wrong; they lead us to falsifications of previously 
held beliefs, and when we appear to have found out an hypothesis is 
in fact wrong, we still increase our body of knowledge, just not in the 
way that we expected to do so. This constitutes the 'no ' part of my 
answer to whether we must claim that scientists do not possess the 
knowledge we think they do. Although theories often turn out to be 
false, scientists still compile a great body of particular true beliefs in 
the process of theory construction and testing. It seems that each time 
we find out we were wrong, we appear to gain an unexpectedly 
justified true belief. Admittedly, the new belief may not be as 
interesting or useful in terms of its predictive and explanatory power, 
but we still have the rigorous hypothesis testing and attempts at 
falsification that occur in scientific practice and allow the body of 
scientific knowledge to expand at a rate envied by practitioners in 
other fields. Such procedures are also what prompt us to praise 
scientific practice as the apotheosis of a rational endeavor. In sum, 
every falsification engenders a new truth or a new hypothesis, and 
what we find equally valuable in science are the methods of testing 
and attempts at falsification, so we need not bemoan any sudden 
evaporation of the vast body of 'scientific knowledge' even if we 
accept a JTB account of knowledge. 
Thus far I have lobbied for the JTB account of knowledge 
largely from a defensive position. Next, 1 intend to sketch (from a 
more offensive position) how the JTB account might be cashed out. 
In particular, (as mentioned earlier) the two camps in epistemology 
differ as to how human achievements measure up against the 
standard of knowledge, and traditionalists are sometimes accused of 
making justification (and hence knowledge) unattainable. For this 
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reason I wish to propose an account of justification that makes 
knowledge more easily attainable, and is also not immune to 
influence by nonepistemic concerns. 
III. A New Look at Justification 
Justification can be earned in degrees, and so, as a component of 
knowledge, it seems that knowledge also can be earned in degrees. 
At the very least, we might claim to know in a weak or strong sense 
(Malcolm 1993). But we can also say that the standard of 
justification varies depending on the context or individual goals and 
perspective of the cognizer. Whether or not one is justified in 
believing X ought to depend in part on what one's goal is with 
respect to believing X, and what consequences (both epistemic and 
nonepistemic) might ensue as a result of believing X. 
For example, Clifford (1993, p. 505) has argued that "it is wrong 
always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon 
insufficient evidence." When Clifford condemns those who believe 
upon insufficient evidence, his condemnation is both epistemic and 
moral, insofar as neglecting one's epistemic duties can be morally 
blameworthy when the lives of others rest on the truth of one's 
belief, and relaxing one 's epistemic standards can make one 
epistemically lazy such that when serious consequences do rest on on 
the truth of one's belief, one may not be able to subject the belief to 
appropriate, careful scrutiny because he or she has formed bad 
epistemic habits. Clifford offers the famous example of the ship 
owner who sends an old ship to sea without having it inspected, 
ignores possible evidence that the ship is unfit for sea travel, and 
instead merely trusts God to keep those aboard the ship safe. Clifford 
claims that the ship owner is both epistemically and morally guilty, 
although he implies that epistemic guilt is moral guilt in light of the 
consequences that might ensue from holding a belief without 
sufficient evidence. 
Although Clifford raises an interesting idea by conflating moral 
and epistemic responsibilities, he seems to develop his idea in an 
overly stringent way, for most of us assume that hastily adopting an 
apparently inconsequential belief will not immediately allow one to 
slip into bad epistemic habits, nor should it constitute a grievous 
moral wrongdoing. It does seem important, however, for one to be 
aware of 'what is riding on' her belief. But if we allow someone to 
believe hastily when nothing much is at stake, will poor epistemic 
habits abound? I doubt that this has to be the case. We may allow for 
a kind of 'sliding scale' justificatory requirement given the individual 
goal of the cognizer without necessarily being threatened with 
epistemic pandemonium. There is a constant standard operative in 
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the assessing of one's goal, perspective, and reasonably foreseeable 
consequences in holding the belief. Thus, although the requirements 
for being justified with respect to a certain belief vary in different 
situations, the method of determining the requirements does not vary. 
Annis (1993) offers the example of two individuals possessing 
the general information that polio is caused by a virus, claiming that 
the "issue-context" of the individual determines whether either has 
enough justification for knowledge. One individual is a 
non-medically trained person while the other is preparing for an 
examination for the M.D. degree. Annis maintains that the context of 
the individual in an M.D. examination requires that he have a great 
deal more information about polio (than the non-medically trained 
person) to qualify as being justified and possessing the knowledge 
that polio is caused by a virus. Annis sees the issue-context as "what 
specific issue involving h [the belief] is being raised. It determines 
the level of understanding and knowledge that S must exhibit, and it 
determines an appropriate objector-group." (1993, p. 282) The 
"objector-group" can basically be understood as the community to 
which S submits his belief for critical scrutiny. The objector-group is 
one that is informed about issues involving h and whose objections to 
h must be seriously considered by S in order for S to be justified in 
believing h. 
We may also conceive of a context in terms of an individual's 
goal, perspective, 3 and the foreseeable consequences of his belief. 
Thus, we might say that the non-medically trained person's goal in 
knowing whether polio is caused by a virus is simply to find out 
whether he ought to avoid certain kinds of contact with those 
afflicted with polio. The medically trained individual, however, 
desires to know for the reason that the first individual noted, but also 
to give others medical advice about the disease and to be considered 
an expert. Thus, the medically trained individual's knowledge will 
affect both the knowledge and the health of many other people. It 
appears, then, that his goal in knowing whether polio is caused by a 
virus requires that he have greater justification in order to possess 
knowledge. But what about the first individual? Will he form bad 
epistemic habits by allowing a softer standard for himself in this 
case? He need not, mostly because he is still required to discern his 
goal in knowing the proposition, his initial perspective, the possible 
consequences of holding the belief, and then judge how much 
justification is required of him in this particular case. Thus, one's 
3 I am using 'perspective' io mean one's standpoint or social situation that reflects 
certain biases and also determines the appropriate 'level' (e.g., child, adult, expert, 
layperson) of objections. Awareness of one's initial perspective on the issue reveals 
one's biases that need to be brought to light and corrected or balanced as much as 
possible. 
JUSTIFIED, TRUE BELIEF: IS IT RELEVANT TO KNOWLEDGE? 119 
discernment of his goal, perspective, and foreseeable consequences 
and then assessing the amount of justification required in light of 
these three things will proceed in much the same way each time a 
belief comes under scrutiny; it is only the actual amount of 
justification required for knowledge that varies from instance to 
instance. 
Also, presumably if one revises her goal or discovers that more 
serious consequences follow from her being mistaken than she 
previously thought, the individual needs to adjust her level of 
justification accordingly and, if possible, avoid bringing about such 
consequences before she has once again achieved the level of 
justification required. In one sense this may sound strange, but it 
actually fits with the way we behave in everyday life. For instance, 
we frequently mention to a friend in an offhand manner a belief or a 
piece of information for which we are minimally justified, only to 
have another individual suddenly join in the conversation and 
question what we just said. Perhaps our remark has particular 
relevance to the third individual's life, for example, a remark about a 
school to which the individual was considering sending her daughter. 
Upon hearing the remark, let us suppose the individual jumps in the 
conversation and wants to hear more, suddenly having doubts about 
sending her daughter to the school being discussed. At this point, we 
will usually qualify our remarks, reporting the source from which we 
heard the information, and perhaps adding "...but don't take my word 
for it!" It is this everyday phenomenon which I am attempting to 
capture in my proposal for a requirement for revising one's standard 
of justification upon discovering a new goal or consequence. 
Revision of a justificatory requirement seems appropriately 
understood in terms of one's goals and possible consequences of the 
belief, and is called for in the above example because suddenly 
"more is riding on" the belief when previously unforeseen 
consequences are introduced with the third interlocutor. 
Admittedly, I see the amount of justification required for 
knowledge as relative to the cognizer. And, of course, because 
justification is context-relative, knowledge is as well, to some extent. 
My allowance of the relativity of justification and knowledge may 
cause some to question whether I am suggesting that truth might be 
variable in the same way. For example, am I secretly suggesting that 
the statement Th i s surface is flat' is true given some goals, but not 
given others? I do not think so, although we surely have to allow that 
words mean different things in different contexts, but as long as we 
specify our meaning in such cases, the appearance of relativizing 
truth can be avoided. We do a sort of informal translation of terms 
quite frequently in ordinary language, and that is what is needed in 
the cases of statements that appear to be true given some goals, but 
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not given others. For example, nonphilosophers use the words 
'proof and 'valid' in a much more casual way than philosophers, 
and we often hear nonphilosophers make comments such as "That's 
a valid point." Are points valid given some goals, but not given 
others? I think it is simpler just to say that nonphilosophers use 
'valid' to mean 'has some presumption in its favor' or 'pretty likely'. 
Also, some nonphilosophers use statements of the form 'Not all X 
are Y' and 'All X are not Y' interchangeably. If we fail to translate 
what such individuals 'really mean' in these cases, it looks as though 
we will forced to admit that the statement 'AH Germans were not 
Nazis' is true given the nonphilosopher's goals. Thus, I think we will 
have less confusion if we simply specify in such cases how a word or 
phrase is being used differently or replace the word or phrase with a 
more appropriate one. 
Next, some might object to my conflating epistemic and 
nonepistemic goals and consequences relevant to belief-formation 
since I allow that epistemic requirements may be influenced by some 
pragmatic consequences of our holding a particular belief, or of our 
being wrong about the truth of a particular belief. However, doing so 
gives us a more flexible notion of justification and may facilitate our 
attainment of knowledge. Also, it is very natural at times to assess 
people epistemically while being influenced by pragmatic goals. For 
instance, let us suppose that we desire to know which plants are safe 
for humans to eat. 4 Assume that individual edible plant-finders A and 
B have the same success rate; out of every ten plants they encounter, 
they determine eight out of the ten correctly (whether they are edible 
or poisonous). If we merely examine the number of true beliefs and 
false beliefs in each case, the number will be same for each 
individual and they might be judged as equals with respect to the 
possession of knowledge about what edible plants look like. Indeed, 
if our goal is simply the tallying of true beliefs as opposed to false 
beliefs about edible plants, A and B appear equally successful at the 
task. 
But suppose that A's errors always amount to believing edible 
plants to be poisonous, while B's errors always amount to believing 
poisonous plants to be edible. Will we still judge them as equals with 
respect to knowledge in spotting edible plants? I am inclined to think 
not, because when considering the goal of survival, and if one does 
not have the cognitive resources to be absolutely certain about which 
plants are edible, it is surely better to err in one direction than the 
other. 5 Thus, in considering pragmatic goals, I am not advocating 
4 This example is similar to one used by Stich (1990). 
5 Note that one could not opt simply to avoid fatal error (ingesting a poisonous 
plant) by always judging the plants to be poisonous, for then one would starve and 
wind up committing another fatal error. 
JUSTIFIED, TRUE BELIEF: IS IT RELEVANT TO KNOWLEDGE? 121 
that pragmatic goals override epistemic goals, but rather that 
pragmatic goals can at least tell us in which direction it is better to 
err. We may say that the individual who errs in the direction that 
leads to our death by poisoning is more unjustified than the one who 
erred in the opposite direction. In short, pragmatic goals and 
consequences occasionally factor into epistemic evaluation and 
requirements, and an appropriate account of justification should be 
sensitive to this phenomenon. 
I have mentioned that the individual has to determine her own 
goal and assess the level of justification needed to know in light of 
her goal, but how does this work? Can one be justified that she has 
ascertained the correct level of justification and the foreseeable 
consequences of the belief? Ultimately, this process is up to the 
individual; how each individual assesses the level of justification 
required for her to know in a particular case will slightly vary, and of 
course some individuals will be more judicious at such a task than 
others. I recommend Foley's (1993) suggestion of how we are to 
make up our own minds as applicable to how we decide how much 
justification to require of ourselves and how to decide when we have 
reached the appropriate level of justification: 
I am to make up my own mind by marshalling my 
intellectual resources in a way that conforms to my 
own deepest epistemic standards. If I conduct my 
inquiries in such a way that I would not be critical of 
the resulting beliefs even if I were to be deeply 
reflective, then these beliefs are rational for me in an 
important sense, an egocentric sense. There are 
various ways of trying to spell out exactly what this 
amounts to, but for purposes here the details can be 
left open. The basic idea is that if I am to be 
egocentrically rational, I must not have internal 
reasons for retraction, ones whose force I myself 
would acknowledge were I to be sufficiently 
reflective. (1993, p. 148) 
Foley goes on to clarify that he does not mean to imply by "deepest 
epistemic standards" that such a process of making up one's mind is 
some kind of private Cartesian process; rather, the process of deep 
reflection should involve holding open a belief to critical scrutiny 
from others (for example, Annis ' objector-group), weighing 
counterevidence, and so on. And again, "marshalling intellectual 
resources" will be influenced by certain pragmatic considerations in 
deciding those cases in which we should continue to gather evidence, 
seek counterexamples, and address problems raised by the 
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objector-group. We may employ a Foley-style approach to one 's 
ascertaining the degree of justification required that, when added to 
other necessary criteria, produces knowledge in a given situation. Of 
course, we can never be perfect predictors of the consequences that 
might ensue from our holding to a certain belief, but we can be 
deeply reflective and at least attempt to avoid epistemic self-blame 
even if others ultimately judge us to be epistemically blameworthy in 
a situation. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
In closing, I have defended the thesis that knowledge ought to be 
defined as justified true belief in some sense. Primarily, I have 
argued that justification, truth, and belief should not be thrown out as 
necessary criteria for knowledge in light of recent charges that the 
JTB accounts can only offer explanations of a subset of knowledge, 
namely propositional knowledge, and say nothing informative about 
skills, which may comprise another subset of knowledge. I have not 
addressed the sufficiency of such criteria, particularly in view of the 
threat of being Gettierized, nor will I, primarily in the interest of 
space. But also, the insufficiency of justification, truth, and belief for 
knowledge does not warrant a rejection of the JTB account of 
knowledge; it merely warrants an addition. Because those who take 
the Gettier problem to be important usually look for a fourth criterion 
to add to justification, truth, and belief, I hope that saving a 
discussion of Gettier concerns for another time does not detract 
terribly from the present paper. I do not see the Gettier problem as a 
frontal attack on the JTB thesis, and so I do not see a discussion of 
the Gettier problem as seriously affecting what I have said about JTB 
accounts, except that another condition might have to be added. 
At any rate, from my earlier discussion I want to conclude that 
justification, truth, and belief still are necessary for knowledge, even 
though apparently in some cases the individual may judge herself to 
require no justification for a particular belief.6 Allowing a kind of 
sliding scale justification relative to the individual's goals provides 
some flexibility that JTB accounts might traditionally have been 
accused of lacking, avoids full blown relativity, and accommodates 
many of our everyday intuitions about knowledge. Furthermore, the 
JTB account appears able to explain some of what is called skill 
6 This can crcaie somewhat of a word game, for one may say that the analysis and 
judgment that one needs no justification for a belief requires a reasoning process that 
is itself a justification for why that belief needs no justification, and I would be 
inclined to agree. Justification can easily though furtively be maintained as a 
necessary criterion for knowledge since one person's unjustified belief is another 
person's self-justified belief. 
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knowledge, albeit with some translation of what goes on in the mind 
of one performing the skill. However, I also maintain that we should 
only preserve the JTB account of knowledge if we recognize that 
knowledge does not stand alone as a cognitive value or ideal. In 
addition, knowledge need not be the only norm recommended for 
human pursuit, nor the only standard against which human cognitive 
achievements are to be evaluated. Obviously, if other 
nonpropositional cognitive achievements are intellectually valuable 
but are not properly called knowledge, then we will require other 
standards against which such achievements are to be evaluated. But 
rather than reject the JTB account of knowledge as insignificant if it 
only accounts for propositional knowledge and not other subsets of 
knowledge such as skills or 'knowledge how,' I want to preserve the 
traditional notion that knowledge is largely propositional insofar as it 
is an attempt to match a belief to a 'fact of the matter,' but add that 
knowledge is not the only cognitive state of any genuine value. 
Although I have not attempted to spell out all that is of cognitive 
value, we may at least hold that success or efficacy at our other, 
nonpropositional cognitive endeavors (e.g., skills) are to be valued as 
highly as knowledge. In this way, we avoid demeaning those 
cognitive activities that are not properly called 'knowledge' but are 
equally valuable and necessary to our survival. 
In light of the above comments, some might question whether I 
really have avoided conceptual change. If we think of the role that 
'knowledge' has played in our system of epistemic concepts, part of 
this role has been as the maximally valuable cognitive state and often 
as the only valuable cognitive state. Admittedly, I am accepting 
major changes in how we think about our epistemic condition, if 
indeed it is true that we previously thought of knowledge as the only 
valuable cognitive state. But merely allowing changes in how we 
think about our epistemic condition and our cognitive values does 
not, as I see it, engender the degree of confusion that arises as a 
result of conceptual change. Thus, I do not see accepting a shuffling 
of our cognitive values as a closet concession on my part. 
Again, my main reason for defending justified true belief as 
knowledge and adjusting our epistemic value system has been 
motivated by a basic principle of preservation. I want to avoid 
conceptual upheaval where possible, and if we throw out 
justification, truth, and belief as criteria for knowledge to expand our 
concept of knowledge, we will (as I see it) either have to devise 
different criteria for various subsets of knowledge, or start 'from 
scratch' and devise new criteria for knowledge as a whole, still 
having to account both for propositional knowledge and for our 
efficacy in nonpropositional cognitive endeavors. On the other hand, 
if we hold on to our traditional criteria for knowledge, we set fewer 
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tasks for ourselves and instead expand our set of cognitive values. In 
doing so, we can (at least for the time being) avoid conceptual 
revolution and hopefully satisfy the interests of a few members from 
both the traditional and the iconoclastic epistemological camps. 7 
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